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Sneering at the Law: An Argument for
Punitive Damages in Copyright
ABSTRACT
The Copyright Act limits statutory damages in a copyright
action to one award for every work that a plaintiff can prove a
defendant infringed. The maximum amount a plaintiff may recover for
each work is $30,000, except in the case of willful infringement, for
which that amount may be increased to a maximum of $150,000. This
Note explains how this dual limitation in the Copyright Act-the
one-award-per-work limitation and the cap on statutory damage
amounts-allows infringers to manipulate court procedures and
corporate structure so that their acts of copyright infringement may
maintain profitability despite the imposition of maximum statutory
damages. Such efficient willful infringement undercuts the deterrence
rationale of the Copyright Act's statutory damages provision. This
Note argues that punitive damages are the most practical solution to
this problem. Punitive damages may be used as a tool to encourage
defendants in infringement actions to submit to the legal process and
may provide copyright claimants with a more ironclad way to recover
defendants' profits when infringers refuse to submit to discovery
procedures. Allowing plaintiffs to plead punitive damages presents a
low risk of unfairness and abuse because defendants may avoid the
imposition of punitive damages by participating in the trial phase of
infringement actions and because a preexisting due process framework
already exists by which courts may check excessive awards.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. "AN AMBIGUOUS HODGEPODGE OF IMPROVISATION":
STATUTORY DAMAGES IN COPYRIGHT... ............... 640
A. Statutory Damages under the 1909 Copyright Act: Per
Infringement .................................... 643
B. The Current Statutory Damage Regime: Per Work........ 644
C. Procedural Implications of the Current Limits............. 647
II. THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE IN STATUTORY DAMAGES ...... 651
A. Copyright Plaintiffs Face Incentives to Choose
Statutory over Actual Damages .................... 652
637
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
B. Punitive Damages under the 1976 Copyright Act.......... 655
C. Statutory Damages May Be Inadequate to Deter
Infringement ............................... .... 657
D. The Law Allows for Efficient Willful Infringement....... 658
1. Joint and Several Liability.... ............ 658
2. Vertical Integration of Severable Infringements 661
3. One Album, One Work ...................... 662
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: PUNITIVE DAMAGES .. ............. 665
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................... 670
Suppose you have written several songs and own the
copyrights. You find that someone has recorded and released one of
your songs without your permission. In fact, this person recorded
three different versions of the song and released those recordings on
separate albums. Your copyright is registered, you have proof of the
three separate infringements, and the infringer does not claim fair use
or any other defense. What is your claim worth?
The Copyright Act contains two alternative damages
provisions: (1) the plaintiff may pursue actual damages and
defendant's profits attributable to infringement, or (2) the plaintiff
may elect to pursue statutory damages.' One of the purposes of the
statutory damages provision is to encourage plaintiffs to bring
infringement claims and go to trial, which may be costly and
inconvenient in cases where they would otherwise face a minimal
recovery (such as when the infringer did not profit and damages to the
plaintiff were minimal).2 Before the addition of statutory damages to
the Copyright Act, the available remedies were ineffective to
discourage "willful and deliberate infringement" because plaintiffs had
little incentive to incur the expense of trial when the infringing
conduct yielded little profit.3
To promote deterrence, Congress amended the Copyright Act to
allow statutory damages up to $150,000 when a court or jury finds
that the defendant willfully infringed the plaintiffs copyright.4 While
under the 1909 Copyright Act the statutory maximum was available
for every act of infringement,5 the 1976 Act amended the language to
allow recovery of only a single statutory award for each infringed
1. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
2. See Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935) (referring to the inclusion of
statutory damages in the 1909 Copyright Act).
3. Id.
4. See Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)).
5. See infra Part I.A.
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work, regardless of the number of separate acts of infringement of that
work by a defendant.6 Thus, in the above hypothetical, even though
the defendant willfully infringed the copyright of the song three times,
the recovery will not be $450,000. In fact, it does not matter if the
infringer made and released one or hundreds of separate recordings of
the song; damages under the statute are limited to a maximum of
$150,000.
This dual limitation on statutory damages-the $150,000 cap
and the limitation to one award per work-means available statutory
damages are less than actual damages and profits whenever the
infringer profits by more than $150,000 for each infringed work.7 In
such a case, the prudent move for the plaintiff is to forgo statutory
damages and seek actual damages and profits. But, an uncooperative
defendant can frustrate a plaintiffs choice. For example, in
Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, a defendant avoided an
accounting of its profits by refusing to appear or to defend.8 Without
access to the defendant's books, the plaintiffs were unable to
adequately prove the defendant's profits.9
When it appears a defendant may not participate in discovery,
the plaintiff must elect to receive statutory damages or else risk being
awarded nothing when the plaintiff cannot duly show actual
damages.10 If the defendant fails to appear, the court may enter a
default judgment and award damages limited to the statutory
maximum for each of the works allegedly infringed." Even if the
court errs in its findings on the number of works, the defendant is still
free to appeal that finding without having had to participate in the
trial.12 Thus, whenever the default judgment is less than the amount
of profit the defendant reaped from the infringement, the defendant
has no incentive to challenge the ruling unless it foresees a reasonable
chance of a reduction in damages on appeal.13 In either case, the
defendant retains a profit in spite of the damages allowed by the
Copyright Act, thwarting the deterrence rationale behind the
statutory damages provision.1 4
What, then, will deter our hypothetical infringer, or the
real-world infringer in the Venegas-Hernandez case? If anticipated
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 2004).
9. Id.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 150-157.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 150-157.
12. See Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 188.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.D.
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profits are greater than the maximum damages allowed, the rational
choice is infringement. If the infringers are caught, they can forgo an
expensive legal defense and accept that it will cost them, at most,
$150,000.15 The infringer simply builds a $150,000 charge into the
cost of doing business. In such a scenario, the statute is inadequate to
deter infringement.
This Note argues that there are hints of a solution in the case
law: punitive damages.16 Although punitive damages are not
ordinarily allowed in copyright claims, allowing a plaintiff to claim
punitive damages above the statutory maximum during the pleading
phase will encourage a defendant to appear in order to contest the
grounds for punitive damages and to participate in pre-trial
discovery." If the defendant fails to appear, a court's ability to enter
an award for punitive damages will provide relief for the plaintiff in
the absence of proof of actual damages and should eliminate the
defendant's profits, even if those profits are above the statutory limit.
This would remove the theoretical incentive to infringe. Allowing
punitive damages is a practical solution because it does not require
amendment of the statute and because it has a basis in the current
case law.18 District court judges may implement this solution despite
a lack of guidance from Congress and higher courts.
Part I details the evolution of the one-award-per-work
limitation in the statutory damages provision and discusses its
immediate procedural implications. Part II explores how the current
Copyright Act and accompanying case law fail to deter willful
infringers who may take advantage of its procedural limitations and
profit in spite of the law's deterrence intent. Part III presents
punitive damages as a solution to the statute's failure to live up to its
purposes in the face of intentional and profitable infringement.
I. "AN AMBIGUOUS HODGEPODGE OF IMPROVISATION" 19 : STATUTORY
DAMAGES IN COPYRIGHT
The Copyright Act affords two alternative remedies for
copyright owners.20 An owner may choose to recover actual damages
as well as any profits attributable to the infringement that were not
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra notes 248-250 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 244-247.
19. Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(referring to the damages provisions under the 1909 Copyright Act).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a).
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taken into account in computing the actual damages.21 Alternatively,
the owner may elect damages that fall within a range provided by the
statute.22 The statute limits damages based on the number of works
infringed and the culpability of the infringer.23 Section 503(c) of the
Copyright Act states:
[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to
recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one
infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly
and severally .... 24
The accompanying House Report states that any single infringer is
liable for one award for each infringed work "no matter how many acts
of infringement are involved in the action and regardless of whether
the acts were separate, isolated, or occurred in a related series."25
Thus, courts allow only one award of statutory damages for
each work infringed, regardless of the number of separate acts of
infringement, so long as the acts were committed by an individual
infringer or by multiple infringers who are jointly and severally
liable.26 This was a departure from the Copyright Act of 1909,27 under
which courts allowed a separate award for each independent act of
infringement, regardless of the number of works at issue.28
Under the current Act, a plaintiff may elect to recover
statutory damages at any time before the court renders its final
judgment29 regardless of the adequacy of evidence of actual
damages.30 A court may award anywhere from $750 to $30,000 for
21. Id. § 504(a)(1).
22. Id. § 504(a)(2).
23. Id. § 504(c).
24. Id.
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 162 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5778.
26. See, e.g., WB Music Corp. v. RTV Commc'n Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir.
2006); Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 194 (1st Cir. 2004); Mason v.
Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1992); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897
F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Sony/ATV Music Publ'g L.L.C. v. D.J. Miller Music Distribs., Inc.
(D.J. Miller 1), No. 3:09-CV-01098, 2011 WL 4729755, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011); Arista
Records L.L.C. v. Lime Group L.L.C., 784 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); MCS Music Am.,
Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3:09-CV-00597, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10312, at *5, *9-10 (M.D. Tenn.
Feb. 5, 2010).
27. An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright § 28, 35 Stat.
1075, 1082 (1909) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)).
28. See, e.g., L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 109 (1919);
Robert Stigwood Grp., Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1976); see generally 4
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[E][2][a][ii] (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 2012) (explaining that the modern construction departs from the case law under
the 1909 Act in disallowing separate claims for multiple acts of infringement).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
30. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[A].
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infringement of one work.31 It may increase the award to $150,000 if
the court finds the infringement is willful,3 2 but it has no discretion to
exceed this statutory limit 33 and is not required to award more than
the statutory minimum of $750 per work, even upon a finding of
willful infringement.34 Neither Congress nor the courts have provided
much guidance as to where within the range awards should fall. 35 The
principal guide is simply that the awards be "just." 36
To be just, in accordance with the statute's deterrence
rationale, statutory damages must be high enough to induce copyright
owners to "invest in and enforce their copyrights" when actual
damages are difficult to prove, as is often the case.37  Other
justifications include deterring infringement38 and providing an
economic incentive to discover minimal acts of infringement.39
Congress has consistently set the statutory maximum for willful
infringement at five times the maximum for ordinary infringement
(the current limit of $150,000 is five times the ordinary infringement
maximum of $30,000).40 Congress established the current maximums
in the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement
Act of 1999.41
The statutory damage limit of $150,000 is in part a result of
political compromise, as it arises from Congress's implementation of
31. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
32. Id. § 504(c)(2).
33. L.A. Westermann Co., 249 U.S. at 106-07; D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912
F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Robert Stigwood Grp. Ltd., 530 F.2d at 1102) (explaining that
the Supreme Court's interpretation that the 1909 Act limits courts' discretion to the bounds of
the statute applies with equal vigor to the 1976 Copyright Act).
34. See Arclightz & Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Video Palace, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 356, 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (awarding the minimum of $750 for the infringement of a single work despite a
finding of willful infringement).
35. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009).
36. See id.
37. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 14.2 (3d ed. 2012); see also 6
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:153 (2012).
38. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049, 1053 (D.
Minn. 2010) (defending a remittitur to $54,000 as sufficient to maintain the deterrent effect);
supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The
Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2186 (1999) (discussing the
deterrence justification of damage multipliers).
39. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in
Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1656 (1998).
40. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[B][3][b] n.149.
41. Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 2(1), 113 Stat. 1774 (1999). Patry asserts that the increase of
maximum damages by $10,000 for ordinary infringement and by $50,000 for willful infringement
was enacted "for no apparent perceived reason." PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:163.
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the Berne Convention.42 By passing the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1989, Congress amended the Copyright Act to
no longer require claimants from foreign nations to register their
copyrights domestically.43 Authors from the United States, however,
still found themselves bound by the registration requirement.44
Because registration is a prerequisite to recovering statutory
damages, Congress also intended the amendment to further
incentivize copyright holders to register. To provide such incentive,
and as a compromise to US copyright holders, Congress "sweetened
the pill" by increasing the statutory remedies.45
A. Statutory Damages under the 1909 Copyright Act: Per Infringement
The 1909 Act permitted multiple awards of the statutory
minimum for separate acts of infringement,46 as construed by the
Supreme Court in L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co.47
The plaintiff in L.A. Westermann owned the copyright in an
illustration of women's clothing designs that the defendant reprinted
in two different advertisements that appeared twenty-six days apart.48
The defendant also published five of the plaintiffs other copyrighted
designs in another edition,49 adding up to seven total acts of
infringement.50 The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
minimum of one award for each act of infringement, including two for
the separate infringements of the same work.51 Thus, going forward,
claimants could receive damages for each distinct act of infringement,
even if defendants only copied one work.
Nearly fifty years later, in Davis v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours &
Co., a district court declined to follow L.A. Westermann, distinguishing
it as inapplicable to radio and television broadcasts.52 The court
reasoned that if the minimums were mandatory, an innocently
infringing broadcast aired on over two hundred stations would result
42. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[B] [1] [b].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Congress was also motivated by compensating for inflation. Id. But see PATRY,
supra note 37, § 22:163 (describing the act as increasing the statutory maximum "for no
apparent perceived reason").
46. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E] ("Under the 1909 Act, it was
sometimes loosely said that the mandatory minimum must be paid for each 'infringement."').
47. L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 109 (1919).
48. Id. at 102-03.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 106.
51. Id. at 109.
52. See Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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in mandatory minimum damages of $50,000.53 As parties involved in
radio and television broadcasting were particularly susceptible to
multiple inadvertent infringements, the court protected them by
restricting per-infringement awards.
Just prior to the passage of the one-award-per-work limitation,
the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed the above
cases and found that courts calculate the number of infringing acts in
myriad ways. The court observed that "when the components of the
infringing activity are heterogenous [sic], [some courts] presum[e] that
each infringing activity is a separate infringement."5 4 That is, when
the infringements occur in separate transactions or are the result of
separate arms of a business enterprise, they merit a separate award.66
Other courts, however, particularly when addressing publication
cases, look to the interval between the publications, finding a single
infringement if the interval was only a few days but finding multiple
infringements if the interval was for a "substantially longer period."56
The Second Circuit called this the "time-test rule."57  These
inconsistent standards in determining what constituted a separate
infringement, inter alia, prompted the revision of the damages
provision of the Copyright Act in 1976.58
B. The Current Statutory Damage Regime: Per Work
In the current Copyright Act, passed in 1976, Congress shifted
the inquiry from determining how many separate acts of infringement
occurred to determining how many distinct works the defendant
infringed, specifying that a court could grant only one award per
copyrighted work.59 In other words, courts no longer could consider
separate acts of infringement; rather, they were to focus on the
number of works infringed and award only one statutory damage
53. Id. Note that this was under the $250 minimum of the 1960s. Under the current
statutory minimum of $750, the fine would have been $150,000.
54. Robert Stigwood Grp., Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1976).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1102-03 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E][2][a] [21).
57. Id.
58. See Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 194 & n.11 (1st Cir.
2004) (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E][2][a]) (suggesting that the difficulty
in determining what were separate infringements "no doubt" led to the revising of the Copyright
Act).
59. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing
Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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award for each.60 This created a "fundamental shift" in damages
calculations from the standards of the 1909 Act. 61
For each separate work infringed, if the plaintiff elects
statutory damages, the court must award the statutory minimum; if a
defendant infringes many works,62 the plaintiff can receive substantial
awards.63 Additionally, courts may choose to award more than the
minimum statutory amount per work, which can lead to very high
judgments. For example, in one case under the 1976 Act, damages
reached $31.68 million for 440 infringed works,64 and in another, they
reached $53.4 million65 for 2,136 infringed works.66 While the court in
the latter case chose to award damages at less than the (then)
statutory maximum of $25,000 per work,67 it had to award at least
$750 per work to comply with the statutory minimum.68 Given the
large number of infringed works, the statutory minimum required the
court to award the plaintiff at least $1,602,000. Such high awards are
potentially detrimental and unfair to defendants; consequently, critics
have called for reform.69
The limitation of statutory damages on a per-work basis serves
also to limit a copyright claimant's flexibility. 70 In Venegas-Hernandez
v. Sonolux Records, the defendant record company, without license,
published sixteen albums, each containing different recordings of two
songs written by the plaintiffs' father.71 When Sonolux Records chose
60. See Patry, supra note 37, § 22:191 ("The limitation applies regardless of whether the
defendant violated the reproduction right 10,000 times, the reproduction right once and the
distribution right once, or any conceivable combination of any of the section 106 and 106A rights.
On the whole, the courts have followed this simple direction.").
61. Id. § 22:184.
62. See Rogers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 623 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
63. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E][1] [a].
64. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d
1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001).
65. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 0OCiv.0472(JSR), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17907, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2000).
66. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v MP3.com, Inc., No. 0OCiv.472(JSR), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13293, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (explaining that the basis for the court's award is a
finding that appropriate damages are $25,000 per infringed CD).
67. Id.
68. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[B][1][b].
69. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 35, at 443 (arguing that statutory damage
awards are particularly likely to be grossly excessive when compared with actual damages); J.
Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The
Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83
TEX. L. REV. 525, 525-27 (2004) (arguing there are due process concerns when an individual who
downloads four thousand songs illegally is liable for a minimum of $3 million dollars in statutory
damages when plaintiffs harm is only $4,000).
70. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
71. Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 185-86 (1st Cir. 2004).
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not to defend against the claims of infringement, the trial court
entered a default judgment.72 Because of the defendant's failure to
appear, the plaintiffs had no opportunity to conduct discovery and
were "disadvantaged" in proving actual damages or defendant's profits
as a result of the infringement.3 The plaintiffs elected to seek
statutory damages.74 The trial court found the infringement was
willful and awarded $1,600,000-a $100,000 award for each of the
sixteen infringing albums.75
After the entry of judgment, Sonolux challenged the basis for
the award, pointing out that the damages should have been limited to
the number of the plaintiffs' songs it infringed rather than the number
of infringing albums on which those songs appeared.76 The trial court
granted Sonolux's motion to amend the judgment, reducing the award
to $200,000, and the plaintiffs appealed.77  The First Circuit
considered the plain meaning and the legislative history of § 504(c)7 8
and, following the holdings of other federal circuits, limited the total
number of statutory damage awards to two, one for each song.7 9
Acknowledging that the statutory provision was a punitive measure
designed to deter infringers,80 however, the First Circuit remanded
the case to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to argue for an increased
award.81 The plaintiffs failed to raise any argument on appeal that
they should be allowed to seek actual damages or the defendant's
profits, so by statute their recovery could not exceed $300,000.82 Thus,
the one-award-per-work requirement and Sonolux's failure to appear
at the trial phase stymied the plaintiffs' ability to recover what the
defendant gained by infringing.
Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, a case the Venegas-Hernandez court
relied upon in interpreting the one-award-per-work requirement,
presented a similar instance in which a plaintiff had difficulty proving






78. Id. at 192.
79. Id. at 195.
80. Id. at 196 (citing Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193 (1992)).
81. Id. at 196-97.
82. Id. at 196. The statutory maximum at the time of the trial was $150,000 per song.
Id. It is doubtful the plaintiffs could successfully have "unelected" statutory damages. Generally,
once the election of statutory damages has been made, "it may not be revoked." PATRY, supra
note 37, § 22:173.
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damages despite many acts of infringement.8 3 In Walt Disney Co., the
defendant ran a wholesale souvenir business through a network of
street vendors that sold t-shirts with six different designs featuring
Mickey and Minnie Mouse to tourists.84 Because the defendant did
not keep business records of how many shirts he sold, making it
nearly impossible for the court to assess actual damages or profits,
Disney elected to seek statutory damages.85 The US District Court for
the District of Columbia based its award of $90,000 on a finding of six
separate infringed works.86 Holding that works are only distinct when
they "live their own copyright life,"8 7 however, the D.C. Circuit
determined that there were only two works at issue-Mickey Mouse
and Minnie Mouse-rather than the six different designs of Mickey
and Minnie that the defendant was selling.88 The court held that the
plain language and legislative history of § 504(c) limit a plaintiff to
one statutory award for each work.89  The same reasoning now
controls in all federal circuit courts that have considered the
question.90
C. Procedural Implications of the Current Limits
Because of the one-award-per-work rule, the type of award a
copyright claimant elects and the procedure he chooses to follow can
greatly affect the amount of relief he receives.91 A plaintiff may file
separate actions against an infringer for each act of infringement in
the hope this might allow recovery of several statutory damage
83. Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 192 (citing Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d
565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
84. Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 567.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 569.
87. Id. (quoting Robert Stigwood Grp. Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir.
1976)). Patry argues that this formulation has "wreaked havoc" on the understanding of the
one-award-per-work requirement, which he asserts is clear from the plain language of the
statute. PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:190; see infra notes 215-221 and accompanying text.
88. Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 570.
89. Id. at 569.
90. See, e.g., WB Music Corp. v. RTV Commc'n Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir.
2006); Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 294
(9th Cir. 1997); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1992); D.J.
Miller I, No. 3:09-CV-01098, 2011 WL 4729755, at *3-4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011).
91. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E][2][b] (explaining that plaintiffs
may avoid the limitation by suing the same infringer in separate actions, so long as such claim
splitting is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata); see also id. § 14.04[E][2][d] (explaining
that some courts will hold separate infringers of a single copyright jointly and severally liable for
a single award while others will hold each separate infringing party liable for a separate
statutory damage award).
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awards rather than one.92 The risk, though, is that once a court
makes a negative ruling on one act or claim, any subsequent claims
may be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata if those claims
could have also been made in the first action.93 Accordingly, this
tactic may result in a smaller overall award than if all claims had
been brought together94 because only the meritless claims should fail
if they were brought in the same action, and the court may be more
generous than the plaintiff anticipates in interpreting the number of
works at issue.
The claimant may also seek to sue separate infringers in
separate actions.95 In Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Department Stores, Inc.,
the plaintiff sought relief against separate defendants, making
"identical" claims in each action regarding a "common series of
transactions."96 The Fourth Circuit noted that the plaintiff was not
under any legal obligation to join the defendants together.97 However,
because the plaintiff had unfavorable rulings on his earlier claims
against several defendants, he was precluded from relitigating those
claims against other defendants by estoppel.98 A plaintiff suing in
successive actions runs the risk of a single unfavorable ruling spoiling
his claims against other defendants.99
Thus, a plaintiff may be better off joining separate infringers
together in a single action even though he runs the risk of the court
finding that the awards are limited to just the particular work(s)
infringed.100 This involves questions of joint and several liability that
complicate the inquiry into whether separate acts of infringement are
separate enough to escape the limitations of the one-award-per-work
requirement.101 According to § 504(c), the statutory minimum and
maximum apply to each infringement with respect to a single work for
92. See Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Dep't Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2007).
93. Id. If it were found that the defendant had not infringed, the doctrine of res judicata
would restrict the plaintiff from relitigating related claims in subsequent actions. 18 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 131.20 (Matthew Bender, 2012). Thus, if a defendant or multiple
defendants had repeatedly (allegedly) infringed one of the copyrighted works, a court finding of
non-infringement or of an incurable defect in the claim regarding one act of infringement would
be binding for all later claims that could have been raised in the same action. Id.
94. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 37, § 14.2.2.2(a).
95. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E] [2] [e].
96. Bouchat, 506 F.3d at 328-29.
97. Id. at 328 ("[W]e do not create a rule of mandatory joinder. . .
98. Id. at 329.
99. Id. ("Any plaintiff who sues joint tortfeasors separately bears the risk that an
adverse determination i  the first action will trigger preclusion doctrines in a later action.").
100. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E] [2] [d].
101. Id.
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which any defendants are jointly and severally liable.1 02  If the
defendants all contributed to a single infringement of a single work,
then no matter how many defendants there are, the plaintiff can only
recover one statutory damage award.103 For each act of independent
infringement, however, the plaintiff may sometimes recover a
separate award.104 When a single defendant is jointly and severally
liable with independent defendants who are not jointly liable with one
another-say, if a person makes a bootleg of a DVD and gives copies to
three different people to distribute-that defendant may be liable for
multiple statutory damage awards for independent infringements of
the distribution right of a single work. 05 This is because the three
distributors of the bootleg are not jointly liable with one another,
justifying three separate awards, which the defendant may not be able
to circumvent by asserting his joint liability with each distributor. 106
However, the mere possibility of joining a defendant to
multiple infringers who are severally liable will not guarantee that a
plaintiff can recover multiple awards.07  In Sony/ATV Music
Publishing LLC v. D.J. Miller Music Distributors, Inc., the plaintiffs
argued that they might have sued the defendants (distributors of
karaoke discs allegedly infringing plaintiffs' copyrights) together with
the various manufacturers of different karaoke versions of a single
work. 08 If they had, plaintiffs argued, then the defendants would
have been jointly and severally liable with each manufacturer, and the
plaintiffs would have been able to recover as many awards per work as
there were manufacturers.109 The plaintiffs explained to the court
that there were good reasons those manufacturers were not
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
103. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[E][2] [d].
104. Id.
105. See Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259
F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding the owner of two television stations liable for two
separate awards for each work because the stations were not joint tortfeasors when they aired
the same episodes of "Who's the Boss?").
106. See id. at 1194 ("[T]o the extent that Feltner seeks to introduce evidence to
demonstrate his connection with each of the stations, that simply makes Feltner a joint
tortfeasor with each station-it does not make each station a joint tortfeasor with respect to the
other."). But see Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183 (D. Mass. 2007) ("[A]
tort plaintiff may not multiply defendants by breaking up a corporation or other institution into
its organizational components when those components have no separate legal identity.").
107. See D.J. Miller I, No. 3:09-CV-01098, 2011 WL 4729755, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5,
2011).
108. Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to JSK Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings I 1(c), Sony/ATV Music Publ'g L.L.C. v. D.J. Miller Music Distribs., Inc., No.
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joined-the litigation costs were prohibitive since some manufacturers
were insolvent and others were judgment proof-and argued that it
should make no difference that they were not named parties in the
suit. 110
The court rejected this argument, holding that the
one-award-per-work requirement means the defendant is liable only
for one work regardless of the number of manufacturers.111 The court
noted that if the defendants named in the suit were found not to be
acting in a jointly liable capacity, the plaintiffs could recover an award
from each defendant per work. 1 12 The statute states that there will be
only one award for each work "for which any two or more infringers
are liable jointly and severally... ."113 Copyright scholar William
Patry asserts that this language serves a dual purpose of allowing
plaintiffs a mode for recovery in the case of judgment-proof defendants
while disallowing plaintiffs from multiplying the number of awards by
making the same argument the Sony plaintiffs made in D.J. Miller.114
In Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, the plaintiff record
companies argued that the file-sharing service LimeWire should be
liable for each individual infringement (of roughly eleven thousand
copyrighted works) by the users of LimeWire, none of whom were
jointly liable with one another.115 The Southern District of New York
disagreed, holding that, even for the separate infringers with whom
LimeWire might be jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff could
recover only one statutory damage award per work.116 In support of
its decision, the court pointed out that the fact-finder may increase the
award within the statutory limits on the basis of the number of direct
infringers.117  In addition, the court explained that allowing the
plaintiffs to recover an independent statutory award from LimeWire
for each direct infringer's sharing of its eleven thousand works would
produce an absurd result: damages that could reach into the trillions
of dollars. 118
It appears that the only circumstance under which a plaintiff
can recover multiple awards from multiple defendants infringing the
same work is if the defendants each infringed a separate right that the
110. Id. I 1(c) n.3.
111. See D.J. Miller I, 2011 WL 4729755, at *5.
112. See id.
113. 17 U.S.C. 504(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
114. See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:194.
115. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Lime Group L.L.C., 784 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
116. See id. at 316.
117. See id. at 316-17.
118. See id. at 317.
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co-defendants had not also infringed.119 Patry gives two helpful
illustrations of situations that could give rise to such a right to
multiple statutory awards:
[1] Defendants A, B, & C, acting in concert, violate the reproduction right. Defendant C,
acting alone, also violates the public performance right. There is one award for violation
of the reproduction right, for which A, B, & C are jointly and severally liable. There is a
second award for violation of the public performance right, for which C is severally
liable.
[2] Defendants A, B, & C, acting in concert to put on [a performance] which is infringing,
violate separate rights. A alone violates the reproduction right. B alone violates the
distribution right. C alone violates the public performance right. There are three
awards, for which each defendant is severally liable. 120
Although it seems quite unlikely that among a group of infringers
each would have violated only one right-and that none of those rights
would have also been violated by the others-there can, at least
theoretically, be multiple awards for the infringement of the same
work by several defendants.121
II. THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE IN STATUTORY DAMAGES
If the infringer is a more efficient producer, his gain may exceed the copyright owner's
loss.
122
The uniform judicial approach to the one-award-per-work
requirement can run counter to the purposes of the statutory damages
provision, which are to deter copyright infringement and to
compensate copyright owners in circumstances when actual damages
and defendant's profits are difficult to prove.123 In the face of a
growing piracy problem, Congress amended the statutory damages
provision in 1999, increasing the available award.124 Preserving the
limitation on damages by the number of works infringed, however,
blunts the damage provision's effectiveness, regardless of how high
the cap is set. Even the maximum allowable damages ($150,000) may
be inadequate to effectively deter willful infringers when plaintiffs
face a strong incentive to elect statutory damages and there are a
limited number of works at issue because defendants may price in
those costs and still profit.
119. See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:196.
120. Id.
121. See D.J. Miller I, No. 3:09-CV-01098, 2011 WL 4729755, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5,
2011) (noting that separate defendants had not been named for severable infringements of the
same work but were alleged to have acted in concert with respect to each act of infringement).
122. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003).
123. See Jeffrey M. Thomas, Comment, Willful Copyright Infringement: In Search of a
Standard, 65 WASH. L. REV. 903, 903 (1990).
124. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, § 14.04[B][1][b].
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Statutory damages are necessary to induce copyright owners to
enforce their copyrights in court and, more broadly, invest in the
creation of copyrightable content in the first place because the value of
the right depends on the power of court enforcement.125 Actual
damages in copyright actions are often difficult to prove.126 If the
threat of statutory damages is the only tool available for some owners
to enforce their copyrights, then it is the only means of deterring
infringement in such cases.127 Inadequate damages may actually
encourage infringing activity that yields a profit despite the
imposition of legal judgment and damages.128  Since there are
instances in which only statutory damages are foreseeably available,
there exists an opportunity for willful infringers to profit from the
inadequacy of the statute and its application by the courts.12 9
A. Copyright Plaintiffs Face Incentives to Choose Statutory over Actual
Damages
Electing statutory damages benefits plaintiffs by allowing them
to avoid the difficulties of proving actual damages or defendant's
profits and forgo the costs of defending those issues on appeal,
particularly if they might lose at the appellate level.130 Some courts
allow a plaintiff to reserve the right to elect statutory damages until
the fact-finder renders a judgment on both actual and statutory
damages.131 But the plaintiff may not revoke the election of statutory
damages once it is made.132 And the statute requires that the plaintiff
elect statutory damages before the entry of final judgment.133
125. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 37.
126. See, e.g., Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935); GOLDSTEIN, supra note
37, § 14.42; PATRY, supra note 37.
127. See supra note 126.
128. See Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. at 209 (explaining that copyright law allows
the recovery of defendants profits in addition to harm to the plaintiff in actual-damages cases
because otherwise the defendant may still gain from the infringement). Note that the opposite
effect may also occur-a defendant's profits, admitted or proven, may be minimal when
compared to the harm suffered by a copyright owner. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary
Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952).
129. See infra Part II.D.
130. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1382 (2d Cir. 1993).
131. See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:171.
132. See Jordan v. Time, Inc., 111 F.3d 102, 104 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Twin
Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1380 (2d Cir. 1993). But see Cotter v.
Christus Gardens, Inc., 238 F.3d 420, 428-29 (6th Cir. 2000) (allowing plaintiff to elect statutory
damages on remand after jury issued alternative awards, one in statutory damages and one in
actual damages, and plaintiff did not make an election). Patry calls the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Cotter "poorly reasoned and incorrectly decided." See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:173.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
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Actual damages are often difficult 34 and at times impossible to
prove. 135 The defendant may profit from infringement that is
inextricably intertwined with a noninfringing, profit-generating
activity, such that it is impossible to discern the portion of the profits
that is attributable to the infringement.3 6 While this ordinarily
favors the plaintiff because the burden is on the defendant to prove an
apportionment based on noninfringing activities,137 the inability of
the plaintiff to know the proportion of defendant's profits due to the
infringement without discovery might encourage him to seek statutory
damages. The harm to the plaintiff may not be ascertainable from
existing evidence,38 or the defendant may avoid discovery
altogether.139 In cases where a plaintiff cannot prove actual harm or
unjust enrichment, the only alternative to minimal or no recovery is to
elect statutory damages.140
Additionally, the costs of discovering a particular act of
infringement may exceed actual damages and defendant's profits to
such an extent that those search costs are recoverable only through
statutory damages.141 When proving actual damages and profits is a
challenge-if, for instance, a defendant fails to appear (as in
Venegas-Hernandez) or does not keep adequate business records (as in
Walt Disney)-the plaintiff puts himself in a far less risky position by
choosing statutory damages.142 Furthermore, a court is less likely to
reduce statutory damages than actual damages on appeal because the
fact-finder at the trial-court level has greater discretion in choosing
the size of the award within the statutory limits.14 3 In sum, there are
compelling reasons why statutory damages are the more appealing
option for plaintiffs.
In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., Judge Learned
Hand considered what proportion of the profits of the film Letty
Lynton were attributable to the play upon which it was impermissibly
134. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 37.
135. See Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935).
136. See, e.g., Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Grp., Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 407 (2d
Cir. 1989); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1939).
137. See Bus. Trends, 877 F.2d at 407.
138. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
139. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
140. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 39, at 1653.
141. See id. at 1656.
142. Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 2004); Walt
Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
143. See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:174 (explaining that because it is not prohibited by
statute, some courts have held that statutory damages bear some relation to actual damages,
while in others they may be awarded regardless of actual damages or profits).
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based.14 4 The analysis was complicated because substantial portions
of the play, including its overall narrative structure, were based on a
story from the public domain.1 4 5 Judge Hand noted that the film's
profits could have derived from a host of factors, including the cast of
actors in the production, their reputations, the producer and director,
the scenery and costumes, and the advertising employed to promote
the film. 1 4 6 He called the problem "insoluble," and fixed the proportion
of the profits attributable to the plaintiffs at one-fifth, acknowledging
that this allotment was "really no more than a guess."147
In cases of collaborative works like films or sound
recordings-which may only infringe in part and which often are
profitable as a result of a concerted effort of creators, hired talent,
engineers, producers, managers, and advertisements-copyright
owners seeking to recover a defendant's profits may fear that the
defendant may prove noninfringing contributions to his profits, which
are very difficult and expensive for the plaintiff to disprove.148 For
complex enterprises, a plaintiff "could hardly verify or contest" a
defendant's apportionment without auditing the entire business.14 9 A
defendant could prove enough costs that "profits could be diminished
even to the vanishing point."150 Electing statutory damages not only
relieves the plaintiff from having to disprove a defendant's profits
attributable to infringement at the trial stage, but also moots all
appellate issues concerning calculations of actual damages and profits,
reducing the uncertainty and cost of litigating these issues on
appeal. 151
Even for plaintiffs who would prefer to seek actual damages
and profits, proving a defendant's profits is not an option for some
copyright owners. In Venegas-Hernandez, for instance, Sonolux
Records avoided discovery by failing to appear, leaving the plaintiffs
with little choice but to opt for statutory damages.152 Plaintiffs who
choose to proceed with a claim for actual damages in these
circumstances run the risk of failing to adequately prove harm or
unjust enrichment and may be left with only nominal damages or,
worse, a finding of no liability. 153
144. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1939).
145. See id. at 50.
146. Id. at 48-49.
147. Id. at 48, 51.
148. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1382 (2d Cir. 1993).
152. Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 185-86 (1st Cir. 2004).
153. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 39, at 1653.
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As a matter of fact, the Venegas-Hernandez plaintiffs proceeded
with a separate claim for actual damages and profits for an album
entitled Sent imientos.154  This turned out to be disastrous, as the
district court found they had failed to prove actual damages or
defendant's unjust profits.15 5 The First Circuit acknowledged that this
failure resulted from the disadvantage of having no opportunity to
obtain discovery.156 Though the plaintiffs had claims for two other
songs that the defendants had infringed in sixteen separate
recordings,157 they mistakenly believed they were entitled to a
statutory damage award for each of the sixteen infringements-which
was fortuitous, since this may have been the real reason they elected
to seek statutory rather than actual damages for these two works.158
Had the plaintiffs sought actual damages for these two songs, they
presumably would have had no recovery at the trial level and Sonolux
would have lost nothing for failing to appear.159  The lesson of
Venegas-Hernandez is that it is much less risky to choose statutory
damages when they are available.
B. Punitive Damages under the 1976 Copyright Act
As a general rule, punitive damages are unavailable under the
Copyright Act. 160 Because the 1976 Copyright Act preempts state
common-law copyright claims,161 the statutory damage enhancement
for willful infringement is the only mechanism by which the law may
deter infringement by awarding damages greater than what the
plaintiff suffers or the defendant gains.162 The language of § 504
contains no indication as to whether or not a court should award
punitive damages.163  Some argue that punitive damages do not
154. Venegas-Hernandez, 370 F.3d at 186.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 185-86.
158. See id. at 186.
159. See id. On the other hand, had they elected for statutory damages in the case of the
album Sentimientos, they may have been eligible to recover an award for each separate song on
the album as well. See id. But see infra Part II.D.3 (discussing case law and scholarship
suggesting an album of sound recordings may constitute only one work within the meaning of the
statute).
160. Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
But see, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ'g, 507 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)
(allowing punitive damages under common-law copyright for pre-1972 sound recordings and
remanding on instructions to offer a remittitur on due process grounds).
161. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
162. See generally PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:151 n.8 (listing cases in all but the First
Circuit interpreting the 1976 Act to have rendered punitive damages unavailable).
163. See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2003).
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comport with the restitution-providing function of the actual-damages
and profits provisions of § 504(a).164 One possible reason for the lack
of recognition of punitive damages in copyright is that courts may
believe the goals of punishment and deterrence are fulfilled by the
statutory maximum of $150,000 per work for willful infringement.1 6 5
In TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, however, a judge in
the Southern District of New York indicated he might allow punitive
damages in addition to actual damages and profits.166 In the interests
of furthering the policies of punishment and deterrence, Judge
Marrero rejected a jury instruction proposed by the defendants that
would have stated that punitive damages were unavailable under the
1976 Act.'6 7 The plaintiffs, though, elected to seek statutory damages,
mooting the issue.16 8
While the Ninth Circuit has recognized a punitive rationale
behind statutory damages, 6 9 Patry argues that § 504(c) serves only to
deter and not to punish.17 0 He points to the Supreme Court's decision
in L.A. Westermann as rejecting a punitive rationale behind statutory
damages.7 1 In L.A. Westermann, the Court wrote:
The idea of the punishment of the wrongdoer is not so much suggested by the language
used in the [1909 Act] as is a desire to provide for the recovery by the proprietor of full
compensation from the wrongdoer for the damages such proprietor has sustained from
the wrongful act of the latter. . . . The statute itself does not speak of punishment or
penalties, but refers entirely to damages suffered by the wrongful act.... Although
punishment, in a certain and very limited sense, may be the result of the statute before
us so far as the wrongdoer is concerned, yet we think it clear such is not its chief
purpose, which is the award of damages to the party who had sustained them ... . 1 72
The deterrence function is distinct from punishment, Patry argues,
because it is designed merely to impose "a high enough penalty so that
defendants will realize that it is less expensive to comply with the law
164. See id.
165. On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001); NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 28, § 14.02[C][2].
166. TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp. (TVT Records 1), 262 F. Supp. 2d 185,
186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Patry is highly critical of this ruling's reasoning and result, believing it
to reflect poor understanding of the statute and of Second Circuit precedent. PATRY, supra note
37, § 22:151.
167. TVT Records I, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 186-87.
168. TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp. (TVT Records 11), 288 F. Supp. 2d 506,
509 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
169. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. Belts by Nadim, Inc., 316 F. App'x 573, 575
(9th Cir. 2009) ("[It is well established that statutory damages may be imposed for both punitive
and compensatory purposes.") (citing L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d
987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998)).
170. PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:174.
171. Id.
172. L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1919) (quoting
Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154-57 (1899)).
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than to violate it."173 If statutory damages fail to impose a penalty
that is high enough, and it is cheaper to violate the law, then the
damage provisions are insufficient to deter infringement. The law
would allow willful infringers to "sneer in the face of copyright owners
and copyright laws."174
C. Statutory Damages May Be Inadequate to Deter Infringement
The combination of the one-award-per-work limitation and the
overall damages cap jeopardizes the deterrence function of the
statutory damages provision when infringers may simply account for
these costs as a part of their bottom line. A defendant who refuses to
appear, robbing the copyright owner of a chance to prove the
defendant's profits from the infringement, faces a maximum claim of
$150,000 per work.1 5  So long as the infringer's profits exceed
$150,000, there is no incentive for the defendant to contest the claim
of infringement, especially since defendants know they can thwart
discovery by refusing to appear.176  In Venegas-Hernandez, for
instance, the plaintiffs had properly served Sonolux with a summons
and a complaint and gave Sonolux notice of the damages hearing after
the court had entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.17
The First Circuit found that Sonolux "intentionally did not appear."178
Sonolux may well have calculated that its profits so exceeded its
maximum liability under the statute that it was not worth the cost of
litigating the case in Puerto Rico, only to have its books opened to the
plaintiffs.
Additionally, transaction costs-specifically, the costs of
discovery and trial-may reduce the likelihood of even innocent
infringers electing to defend against infringement claims. If the sum
of the infringer's anticipated litigation costs and its expected liability
for innocent infringement (up to $30,000) exceeds $150,000, it makes
no financial sense to contest the claim.179 It is an added bonus that
173. PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:174.
174. Int'l Korwin Corp. v Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. See Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 186, 195 (1st Cir. 2004).
177. Id. at 187.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 186 n.2. One ramification of such perverse incentives is that they provide
a rational boundary for any settlement between the parties. The hypothetical
Venegas-Hernandez plaintiffs, knowing that Sonolux has every incentive not to appear, are
better off filing for statutory damages and rejecting any settlement offer under $150,000 minus
their litigation costs. However, the only settlement offer Sonolux would reasonably make would
be less than $150,000, its maximum exposure from a judgment. The reasonable floor would be
determined by subtracting the plaintiff's anticipated litigation expenses. A plaintiff who is
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the plaintiff will thereby lose the opportunity to prove defendant's
profits after the plaintiff elects statutory damages.180
A willfulness determination may have other consequences for
the defendant apart from increasing the judgment owed to the
plaintiff, including "loss of insurance coverage, encouraging
shareholder derivative suits, and loss of bankruptcy exemptions."181
But derivative suits are less likely if the damages are as minor as they
were in Villegas-Hernandez or when the defendant is a small, private
company. 182 While these secondary effects of a finding of willfulness
might marginally increase the perceived risk of intentional
infringement, this Note assumes a non-risk-averse profit seeker-one
who is already willing to ignore copyright laws whenever it appears
that the costs of infringement are less than the potential profit. For
such an infringer, the secondary consequences of a finding of
willfulness are less of a concern than for ordinary defendants who
intend to comply (or wish to appear to comply) with the law. Most
importantly, the monetary penalties of the statute do not serve to
adequately deter such infringement.
D. The Law Allows for Efficient Willful Infringement
Because of the procedural complexities of liability for copyright
infringement, some infringers may seek to reduce their exposure to
multiple damage claims by avoiding dealings with multiple other
infringers independent of one another, by vertically integrating
infringing operations, or by attempting to manipulate the number of
works at issue.
1. Joint and Several Liability
D.J. Millerl8 3 illustrates how the one-award-per-work
requirement may allow an infringer to profit by manipulating his
exposure to joint and several liability. The plaintiffs in D.J. Miller
sued various karaoke manufacturers for allegedly manufacturing and
expected to spend more money litigating an infringement would merit a lower settlement offer
from the defense. See generally supra Part II.C.
180. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 37, § 14.0.
181. In re Braun, 327 B.R. 447, 452 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005); PATRY, supra note 37,
§ 22:180.
182. Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 2004) (awarding
$200,000 for infringement of two works under the then-statutory maximum of $100,000 for
willful infringement of a single work).
183. See D.J. Miller I, No. 3:09-CV-01098, 2011 WL 4729755, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5,
2011).
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distributing karaoke discs in violation of plaintiffs' copyrights. 184 The
defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that
the plaintiffs were seeking damages on a per-infringement rather than
a per-work basis.185 On several occasions, the plaintiffs had listed in
their complaint more than one claim for a particular sound recording,
arguing that the usual one-award-per-work requirement should not
apply.186 To get around this limitation, the plaintiffs argued that the
defendants were distributing several unlicensed "brands," each
consisting of a different karaoke version of a particular work, and each
of which was manufactured by a separate entity.187 The plaintiffs
argued that prohibiting additional claims for the different "brands"
would give infringing distributors an incentive to expand their
catalogue to encompass as many "brands" as possible with respect to a
given work because their liability would be limited to one award. 188
Further, the plaintiffs argued that those in the business of
manufacturing unlicensed recordings would benefit from a
distribution network that faced no additional liability when taking on
new "brands," so long as the unlicensed recordings were of the same
copyrighted works as those it was already distributing. 189
The plaintiffs pointed out that under the one-award-per-work
requirement, each of these manufacturers would be liable for a
statutory award as long as the defendants had not operated jointly in
manufacturing the recordings.190 If they had individually sued ten
manufacturers, for example, each of which had made a unique
recording of a single copyrighted work, the plaintiffs could recover ten
statutory damage awards because the manufacturers are not jointly
and severally liable with one another.191 If one of the actual defendant
distributors in the case joined these hypothetical codefendants, it
would face joint liability for contributory infringement for each of the
claims against the manufacturers, meaning the defendant would be
jointly and severally liable for ten statutory damage allotments even
though there is only one copyrighted work.192 The plaintiffs argued
that allowing only one award per work requires similarly situated
copyright owners to "undertake the charade of filing separate actions"
184. Id. at *1.
185. Id. at *1-2.
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id.; see also D.J. Miller Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 109, ¶ 1.
190. D.J. Miller I, 2011 WL 4729755, at *3.
191. Id. at *5.
192. See id.
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in order to achieve multiple awards.19 3  In addition to this
judicial-economy argument, the plaintiffs complained it was unfair to
require copyright owners to sue manufacturers who may have
dissolved or otherwise become judgment-proof, as was the case for
many of the karaoke manufacturers. 194
The D.J. Miller court, however, granted the defendants' motion
and dismissed the plaintiffs' duplicate claims because it considered the
law settled as to the interpretation of the one-award-per-work
requirement.1 9 5 The court noted that all the federal courts of appeals
that had considered the issue were in agreement and declined to find
in favor of the plaintiffs on mere policy grounds.196 The court pointed
out that the plaintiffs did not fit into the potential categorical
exception to the rule because they had not named any of the allegedly
independently liable manufacturers in their complaint. 197
A similar situation arose in Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group
LLC, in which the plaintiffs actually had named some of the
independently liable infringers along with the secondarily liable
defendant LimeWire. 198 In that case, the district court rejected on
policy grounds the plaintiffs' argument that LimeWire should be
jointly liable with all the direct infringers, who were responsible for
independent infringements of over ten thousand works.199  The
damages for secondary liability could have reached into the trillions of
dollars, an absurd result even in the realm of statutory damages for
copyright infringement.2 00
D.J. Miller and Lime Group illustrate that the current
one-award-per-work limitation can be both inadequate, as in the
hypothetical raised by the D.J. Miller plaintiffs, and overbroad, as
suggested by the fact that LimeWire could theoretically be liable for
amounts far beyond any possible actual damages.201 While Lime
Group raises the possibility of overbreadth,202 there are few cases
193. D.J. Miller Plaintiffs' Response, supra note 109, 1 1(c).
194. Id. I 1(c) n.3.
195. D.J. Miller I, 2011 WL 4729755, at *4-5.
196. Id.
197. Id. at *5.
198. Arista Records L.L.C. v. Lime Group L.L.C., 784 F. Supp. 2d 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
199. Id. at 317.
200. Id.
201. See id.; see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 35, at 444-45 (exploring
multi-million dollar awards of statutory damages in cases where no evidence of actual harm to
plaintiffs or profits to defendants was shown and arguing that copyright law has strayed from its
historical basis in compensating the copyright owner, focusing too heavily on deterrence).
202. See Arista Records, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 317; see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.com, Inc., No. 0OCiv.472(JSR), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000)
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illustrating blatantly inadequate awards. One reason for the lack of
plainly inadequate statutory awards is that if the plaintiff had the
evidence to demonstrate the inadequacy of the damage award, he
would originally have opted for actual damages rather than statutory
damages because he could have used the same evidence to prove
damages. Consider Venegas-Hernandez: if it is true that the
defendants failed to appear because their profits exceeded any possible
liability under the statutory regime, then the statutory awards are
inadequate when compared with the actual damages, which the
plaintiffs could not prove.203  More importantly, the above cases
illustrate that a defendant may have other means of reducing liability
by limiting the number of works at issue, regardless of the number of
different means or acts of infringement (such as the use of different
"brands" in D.J. Miller).
2. Vertical Integration of Severable Infringements
The plaintiffs' argument in D.J. Miller illustrates another way
in which statutory damages may be inadequate to deter infringement.
If the distributors violated only the distribution right for each sound
recording, and the manufacturers violated only the reproduction right,
then the plaintiffs may have been able to seek a separate award from
each defendant, had they all been named in the same lawsuit.2 0 4 But
imagine that the defendants controlled both manufacturing and
distribution, rather than just distribution, and vertically integrated
the creation of each infringing "brand" into its distribution network.
The entities violating the various § 106 rights would no longer be
separate.
In the above hypothetical, the defendants could strategically
reduce liability by joining the jointly and severally liable defendants.
The plaintiffs would be unable to argue that the manufacturing
operation and the distribution arm are separate businesses, justifying
separate awards, because a copyright owner may not name multiple
units of a single company in order to increase the number of
defendants and available statutory awards.205 Not only would the
karaoke distributor face no additional liability by incorporating the
manufacturer into the suit, but it would also reduce its total possible
liability. This shrinks the universe of infringing entities against
(determining the appropriate measure of damages to be $25,000 for each of 4,700 infringed CDs
for a total award of approximately $118 million despite the lack of any proof of actual damages to
the plaintiff).
203. See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Part II.D. 1.
205. See Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182-83 (D. Mass. 2007).
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which the copyright owners may bring a claim for an independent
award. The infringing distributor reduces its own liability by
conglomerating the infringing businesses, which thereby reduces the
ability of the copyright owner to seek redress. At the same time, the
infringing distributor increases the likelihood that its profits will
exceed the maximum total liability by so limiting the total damages it
may face, thereby incentivizing efficient willful infringement.
For a less risky strategy, the distributor may only integrate one
manufacturer of a particular brand into its distribution network. As
long as that in-house manufacturer produces recordings of every other
"brand" the distributor acquires and sells from other
manufacturers-much like a grocery store sells both generic and name
brands-the distributor protects itself from additional liability
because it is infringing both the distribution and the reproduction
rights of every work.206 The copyright owner would not be able to hold
the distributor (or its in-house manufacturer) severally liable on the
theory that it engaged in a distinct infringement of a separate right
from the various manufacturers.207 If the copyright owner tries to sue
the various other manufacturers, it must not do so in the same action
as the distributor because there will be no additional liability for the
infringement of the reproduction right (since the distributor already
violated the same right in the same work).208 If the copyright owner
does not sue them together, however, it may face res judicata in any
separate action for findings of noninfringement or on any ruling
regarding the number of works at issue.209 Finally, the question of
whom to sue first is more vexing when the plaintiff cannot know
which defendants will show up to defend.210 A plaintiff trying to sue
our hypothetical infringer faces a pleading quagmire if he wishes to
recover more than just the statutory maximum for each work.
3. One Album, One Work
A willfully infringing party has another strategy by which it
may further reduce the number of works at issue on appeal-all the
songs that appear on the same album arguably constitute parts of only
one work under the statute.211 By the terms of the statute, all parts of
a compilation or derivative work constitute a single work for the
206. See supra Part I.C.
207. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part I.D.1.
211. See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:185.
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purposes of determining statutory damages.212  By intentionally
copying works that appear together in compilations, an infringer may
limit its liability dramatically if it can successfully argue that each
album or compilation is only one work.213 For example, in Bryant v.
Media Right Productions, Inc., the Second Circuit found that all sound
recordings on an album are part of a compilation and do not represent
more than one work for the purposes of statutory damages.214 If
Bryant represents the direction in which the law is evolving-a likely
conclusion, considering the Second Circuit's prominence in
determining copyright law-it would be even easier for infringers to
minimize liability when they infringe multiple sound recordings from
a single musical compilation and from a single album by one artist.
A possible solution to this works-in-a-compilation problem
could be an extension of the "independent economic" test from Walt
Disney, which considers whether the alleged works each "live their
own copyright life." 2 15 Under this sort of test, since retailers sell
separately the sound recordings in a musical compilation, they would
be considered separate works.216  It follows that all the sound
recordings on a single album, whether they were written by one
author or several, would represent separate works that live their own
independent economic lives on iTunes, Spotify, Pandora, etc.
Courts and commentators have given mixed support to the
"independent economic" doctrine. While Patry strongly criticizes it as
being inconsistent with the statute and unnecessary in the face of the
statute's clear language,217 it is presumably still good law in the First
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit,2 18 and it is implied to be the law in the
212. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
213. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010); see also
Wyatt J. Glynn, Note, Musical Albums as "Compilations'" A Limitation on Damages or a Trojan
Horse Set to Ambush Termination Rights?, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 375, 375-76 (2011)
(discussing Bryant).
214. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141; see also PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:186 (discussing Bryant
and arguing that it represents the correct interpretation of the statute). But see WB Music Corp.
v. RTV Commc'n Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding "compilation" depends on
whether the copyrights were issued separately or together as a unit); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v.
Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1380-81 (2d Cir. 1993).
215. See supra note 87; PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:190; see also Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at
1381 (finding eight separately produced episodes of the television series Twin Peaks each
constituted a separate work).
216. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381 ("The author of eight scripts for eight television
episodes is not limited to one award of statutory damages just because he or she can continue the
plot line from one episode to the next and hold the viewers' interest without furnishing a
resolution.").
217. See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:190.
218. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing
Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.219 The Second Circuit, however, which
initially gave life to the doctrine in Twin Peaks Productions v.
Publications International, recently rejected it in explicit terms in
Bryant, stating that it had "never adopted the independent economic
value test" and that the language of the statute does not permit
awards for each song on an album.2 2 0 The court dismissed the notion
that policy considerations can trump the statute, writing:
We cannot disregard the statutory language simply because digital music has made it
easier for infringers to make parts of an album available separately. This interpretation
of the statute is consistent with the Congressional intent expressed in the Conference
Report that accompanied the 1976 Copyright Act, which states that the one-award
restriction applies even if the parts of the compilation are "regarded as independent
works for other purposes."
2 21
Under the interpretation favored by the Second Circuit and
Patry, the willfully infringing party may, on appeal, further reduce its
liability to one award for each group of songs that appeared on the
same album. For instance, had the plaintiffs in Venegas-Hernandez
sought statutory rather than actual damages for the Sentimientos
album,222 Sonolux would have been able to argue successfully that it
was liable only for one additional statutory award. If such an
infringer, having opted not to defend at the trial level to avoid
discovery and the costs of litigation, received a favorable ruling at the
trial level on the issue of the number of works eligible for individual
awards, it of course would not appeal, saving substantially on legal
fees.
These factors-the prevailing one-award-per-work limitation
and the Second Circuit's adherence to the plain language of the
statute-increase the likelihood that the current statutory damages
provisions are inadequate to deter willful infringers. There are
scenarios in which an infringer may profit in spite of a judgment
awarding maximum statutory damages for all the works infringed.
For this reason, the current law may serve, in some instances, not as a
deterrent, but as an incentive to infringe.
219. See MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1996) (allowing an
award for nine hundred separate telecasts because of a pretrial stipulation under which the
defendant incredibly agreed that each was a separate act of infringement); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Xanthas, Inc., 855 F.2d 233, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding damage calculation based on the
doctrine when the defendant did not challenge on appeal).
220. Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
221. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1976)).
222. See supra Part II.A.
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: PUNITIVE DAMAGES
[T]he offender may profit from underenforcement, potentially engendering diminished
deterrence and encouraging additional or sustained misbehavior by the same or other
wrongdoers.2 23
Some critics of the current statutory damages provisions in
copyright have suggested that Congress amend the statute in various
ways to avoid unfairness to copyright defendants.224 Others have
suggested a wholesale rethinking of copyright enforcement to provide
alternatives that would adequately compensate the creators of
copyrighted content without subjecting sellers and users to unforeseen
and disproportionate harm.225 But legislation regarding copyright
may be exceedingly difficult to pass given the growing saliency of its
potential effects on Internet freedoms and commerce.226 If digital
content providers such as Google have the ability to prevent the
passage of copyright legislation that impedes their interests,227 and
Congress still feels beholden to the interests of copyright content
providers, namely the entertainment industry,228 then reform of
223. TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.3d 82, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2005).
224. See Barker, supra note 69, at 533-34 (proposing Congress make an exception to the
statutory minimum damages for consumers named in peer-to-peer infringement suits); Mark A.
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting
Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1413 (2004) (suggesting amending the statute to provide an
option for defendants in peer-to-peer infringement actions to choose administrative dispute
resolution before an ALJ in the Copyright Office); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 35
(proposing amendment removing statutory minimums in cases of innocent infringement and a
provision to avoid grossly excessive penalties when aggregating many claims).
225. See, e.g., Aric Jacover, I Want My MP3! Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme to
Combat Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications, 90 GEO. L.J. 2207,
2250-53 (2002) (suggesting a metering and royalty collection through compulsory licenses for
Internet services that allow downloadable content or, alternatively, a tax on all businesses
profiting from digital copyrightable content, including ISPs, computer and hard drive
manufacturers, and Internet services providing content).
226. See Larry Magid, SOPA and PIPA Defeat: People Power or Corporate Clout?,
FORBES (Jan. 31, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/31/sopa-and-
pipa-defeat-peoples-power-or-corporate-clout (explaining that the issues leading to the failure of
SOPA and PIPA marshaled both public dissent along with the lobbying power of tech giants such
as Google, and that this may be a precursor for oversized political influence).
227. Id.
228. See Will Evans, Hollywood Money Flows to Calif. Politicians Who Support
Anti-Piracy Bills, CALIFORNIA WATCH (Jan. 24, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/
hollywood-money-flows-calif-politicians-who-support-anti-piracy-bills-14591 (discussing the
entertainment industry's $14 million in contributions to US Senators compared with Internet
interest groups' $2 million); Richard Verrier, Petition Demands Probe into Comments by MPAA
Chief Chris Dodd, COMPANY TOwN (Jan. 22, 2012, 8:59 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
entertainmentnewsbuzz/2012/01/sopa-saga-continues-with-online-protest-over-dodds-remarks.
html (quoting Dodd as threatening to withhold campaign support from Congress members who
do not support tougher anti-piracy laws).
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copyright laws may become a third rail for politicians until these two
industries can reach a compromise. In the meantime, the system will
continue to lack a solution to the problem outlined in this Note.
Furthermore, any proposed amendment raising the statutory damages
cap would require Congress to guess what amount is sufficient to
deter any foreseeable scheme that may be profitable in light of the
one-award limitation and the statutory cap. Therefore, adequate
statutory reform would need to incorporate both a high damages cap
and a relaxing of the one-award-per-work limitation. Such changes to
the statute would only exacerbate criticisms of grossly excessive
awards levied against innocent infringers and consumers through
aggregated claims.229 For these reasons, a judicial approach, which
may tailor results based on the equities, is preferable.
While courts generally hold that punitive damages in copyright
are unavailable,230 a few cases have questioned the prevailing general
rule.2 3 1 In TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, Judge Victor
Marrerro of the Southern District of New York held that punitive
damages were not precluded in copyright infringement actions.232 In a
later opinion, ordering the offer of remittitur,233 Judge Marrerro
analyzed the history of punitive damageS2 34 and their purpose235 and
found that punitive damages serve to not only punish the individual,
but also to discourage "other persons from engaging in similar
wrongful conduct."236  He applied these principles through the
framework of State Farm and Gore, reducing the punitive award for
copyright infringement.2 37 Holding that punitive damages are not
precluded in copyright as a matter of law, Judge Marrerro dismissed
229. See supra notes 198-200.
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See Blanch v. Koons, 329 F. Supp. 2d 568, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing TVT Records
I, 262 F. Supp. 2d 185, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); TVT Records I, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 186; see also
Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., No. 01-CV-7109(GEL), 2003 WL 1787123, at *10
(S.D.N.Y April 3, 2003) (implying punitive damages may be available in copyright if there were
malice or ill will toward the claimant). But see Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d
461, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In Viacom Intl v. Youtube, Judge Stanton acknowledged that his
earlier decision in Blanch was, along with TVTRecords 1, contrary to the prevailing case law and
uncontrolling. 540 F. Supp. 2d at 463-64. Judge Stanton held that Blanch was a "tentative
accommodation" that should not be extended to a case in which the infringed works were
expected to be identified through discovery and the plaintiff had sufficient remedy. Id.
232. TVT Records I, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
233. TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.3d 82, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2005).
234. Id. at 419-22.
235. Id. at 422-26.
236. Id. at 423 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 583 U.S. 408, 415
(2003)).
237. Id. at 442.
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the argument that the Copyright Act allocates the compensatory
remedy to the actual damages and profits provision of § 504(b) and
assigns deterrence and punishment exclusively to the statutory
damages provision of § 504(c).238 He pointed out that under the actual
damages provision, the policy of punishment and deterrence is not
"properly accounted for." 2 39
Patry is highly critical of this interpretation, arguing that the
two sections of the statute cannot be read in isolation and that the
provisions of § 504 as a whole represent Congress's policy approach.240
But while Patry argues that Judge Marrerro's view lacks
"appreciation for how statutes work,"241 he does not account for the
judge's underlying policy concern, which is that there are instances in
which there will be no imposition of statutory damages, either because
the plaintiff elects not to seek them or because the statute bars them
under the circumstances.2 4 2 The Venegas-Hernandez case illustrates
how statutory damages are an insufficient deterrent when the
plaintiff elects to seek actual damages.243 And cases such as Blanch v.
Koons demonstrate that there are no available statutory damages, and
thus no deterrence, when a claimant has not registered her works
prior to the infringement.24 4
The prevailing case law does not favor punitive damages for
copyright infringement.2 45 Nonetheless, deterrence is an aim of the
damage provisions of the Copyright Act.2 4 6  This Note has outlined
238. TVT Records 1, 262 F. Supp. 2d 185, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
239. Id.
240. See PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:151.
241. Id.
242. TVTRecords I, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
243. See supra Part II.C.
244. Blanch v. Koons, 329 F. Supp. 2d 568, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Viacom Int'l,
Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that the plaintiff
in Blanch could not prove any actual damages or defendant profits, and thus was faced with the
lack of available relief).
245. See Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182-83 (D. Mass. 2007); see
also PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:151 ("Punitive damages are never available for copyright
infringement actions brought under the 1976 Copyright Act."); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
28, § 14.02[C] [2] ("It is therefore suggested that this rogue decision [TVT Records] should not he
followed, in light of the profusion of contrary cases . . . ." (footnote omitted)); 2 HOWARD B.
ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 17:22 (2012) ("Given the consistent holdings of the great
majority of cases that punitive damages are not available as a remedy for copyright
infringement, TVT Records and Blanch are dubious precedents to say the least.").
246. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 163 (1976) ("[Bly establishing a realistic floor for liability,
the provision preserves its intended deterrent effect . . . ."); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 145 (1975)
(using the same language); see also PATRY, supra note 37 (stating that among the purposes for
statutory damages was the worry that damages amounting to lost license fees "would not provide
an adequate enough incentive to discourage infringement") (citing the Report of the Register of
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several instances in which neither statutory nor actual damages alone
might be sufficient to deter infringement. Most alarming is the notion
of an infringer that remains profitable despite the maximum
punishment that the law can provide under statutory damages.247 If
such an infringer is willing to accept the full punishment the courts
are capable of levying and continues to infringe, then the statute has
failed outright in its aim of deterrence. For this reason, the courts
should be willing to accept the so-called "rogue" precedent set by the
Southern District of New York in TVT Records and Blanch v. Koons.2 48
While neither ultimately applied punitive damages,249 they provided a
framework for allowing plaintiffs to ask for punitive damages in
certain narrow circumstances.
Courts should allow a plaintiff to plead punitive damages only
in situations such as those outlined in Part II in which an alleged
infringer seeks to avoid liability for actual damages by refusing to
appear to defend. If the plaintiff could make a claim for punitive
damages in his complaint, the court would have the power to enter a
default judgment against a defendant who did not appear, awarding
the amount of punitive damages set out in the plaintiffs claim for
relief under Rule 54(c).250 The defendant would have notice of the
amount of damages sought when served with process, which would
undercut any due process argument the defendant may raise on
appeal. Such an argument would be especially difficult for the court to
sustain when there are indications the defendant failed to appear in
order to avoid discovery.251 This allocates the risks of failing to appear
to the defendant: the defendant has an incentive to defend when its
potential liability is greater than that allowed by the statute. The
purpose behind allowing such a rule, then, is not necessarily to punish
the infringer but to provide an incentive for that infringer to appear in
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 102-03 (House Comm. Print
1961)).
247. See supra Part II.D.
248. See supra NIMMER & NIMMER, note 28, § 14.02[C] [2].
249. See TVT Records II, 288 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that TVT
elected to seek statutory damages, thus mooting the issue of punitive damages); Blanch, 396 F.
Supp. 2d at 478 (awarding summary judgment for the defendant on fair use grounds and
dismissing all of plaintiffs claims for damages).
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c).
251. See James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding grant of punitive
damages in default judgment, and noting that Rule 55 does not require an evidentiary hearing
on damages in default judgments and grants courts wide latitude as to whether to conduct such
a hearing); Tax Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Mitchell, 07-CV-00249-REB-KLM, 2009 WL 464679, at *3
(D. Colo. Jan. 13, 2009) (noting that the award of punitive damages in default judgments without
a separate damages proceeding is especially justifiable in cases where defendant "neglect[s] his
discovery responsibilities" and then wishes to challenge damages after the fact (citing James, 6
F.3d at 309-11)).
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court as a defendant, to open itself to discovery for the purposes of
supporting the remedy of actual damages and profits, and to provide
any defenses it has on the merits.
Most importantly, a rule allowing the pleading of punitive
damages in copyright would eliminate the potential incentive for
willful infringement created by the combination of the statutory
damage limitation and the requirement that there be only one award
per work infringed. Defendants would need to appear in order to
contest punitive damages. Otherwise, they would need to resort to a
motion under Rule 60 to have the court reopen the case, at which
point the plaintiff may again get the opportunity to conduct discovery
as to actual damages and profits.252 In either case, the plaintiff has
the opportunity to seek relief and the law inhibits the infringer from
profiting from his violations.
If the courts begin to recognize punitive damages, there might
be a worry such recognition would undermine the directives of the
statute and could be used to impose unfair awards on defendants. The
actual damages and profits provisions of § 504(b) are explicit in
preventing double recovery, a limitation on the imposition of punitive
damages for copyright defendants that actually appear. If the plaintiff
is able to prove actual damages or defendant's profits after discovery
and on the merits, the prohibition of double recovery will prevent the
award of punitive damages. But the initial burden would be on the
defendant. So long as the defendant allows the plaintiff to prove
actual damages and profits, it may avoid the imposition of punitive
damages.
Due-process jurisprudence is an additional limitation on
punitive damages in copyright. In Bridgeport Music, the Sixth Circuit
suggested that due process limited punitive damages in copyright
claims to a 1:1 or even a 2:1 compensatory-to-punitive-damages
ratio-the latter when there was only one "reprehensibility factor"
present.253 In TVT Records, Judge Marrerro engaged in a lengthy
analysis of how a court would apply due process analysis to punitive
252. Note that Rule 60(b)(6) allows the court to "relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment" for "any other reason that justifies relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 60. Section (d) states that
the rule does not limit the court's power to "entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(1). This raises another possible
issue-the statute allows a plaintiff to elect statutory damages at any time before the entry of
final judgment. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Ostensibly a court would allow a
plaintiff to elect statutory damages in a secondary proceeding under Rule 60 if it could not
adequately prove defendants profits or actual damages. But the defendant would have an
argument based on the language of the statute that a final judgment had been issued and that
therefore the plaintiff had lost the opportunity to elect statutory damages.
253. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ'g, 507 F.3d 470, 486-89 (6th Cir. 2007)
(allowing punitive damages in a common-law copyright claim).
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damages in the copyright setting.2 5 4 These cases provide a framework
for courts engaging in such an analysis upon entering a default
judgment against a non-appearing defendant.255
IV. CONCLUSION
The damages provisions outlined in § 504 of the Copyright Act
have, in addition to a compensatory aim, a deterrence rationale that
underlies the creation of statutory damages as an alternative to actual
damages and profits.256 The Copyright Act limits statutory damages
to one award for each work infringed by a defendant in a copyright
action.257 The cap on damages coupled with the limitation to one
award per work may serve to create maximum recoverable damages
that are below the actual damages and profits from the defendant's
infringing activity.258  When this is the case, the infringer may
effectively deprive the plaintiff of the option of proving actual damages
and profits by refusing to defend against the claims of infringement.2 59
A court's best recourse is to enter a default judgment of maximum
statutory damages.260 This is no deterrent to a willful infringer who
profits from violating copyright laws and expects to lose in an
infringement suit.
The best solution to this problem is for courts to allow plaintiffs
to seek punitive damages in the complaint. Defendants who fail to
appear run the risk of a default judgment that may be substantially
higher than the maximum statutory award. Punitive damages
provide a greater incentive for defendants to appear in court, where
254. See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text.
255. In recognizing due process limitations, the court stated:
[L]arge awards of statutory damages can raise due process concerns. . . . Extending
the reasoning of Gore and its progeny, a number of courts have recognized that an
award of statutory damages may violate due process if the amount of the award is
"out of all reasonable proportion" to the actual harm caused by a defendant's
conduct. . .. [T]hese cases are doubtlessly correct to note that a punitive and grossly
excessive statutory damages award violates the Due Process Clause ....
In re Napster Copyright Litig., No. C-MDL-00-1239-MHP, 2005 WL 1287611, at *10-11 (N.D.
Cal. June 1, 2005) (quoting Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604, 612 (N.D. Cal. 2004)); see
also PATRY, supra note 37, § 22:193.50 (summarizing statements by courts expressing hesitancy
in awarding statutory damages greatly in excess of actual damages in peer-to-peer file sharing
infringement suits); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rassett, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir.
2012) (analyzing a claim that high statutory damages violate due process and rejecting that
claim, in part, because Congress rooted statutory damages in harm to the public rather than
harm to the plaintiff).
256. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part I.B.
258. See supra Part II.D.
259. See supra Part II.
260. See supra Part II.
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they must participate in discovery and allow the plaintiff to make a
showing of actual damages and profits. If copyright infringers have to
weigh the possibility of losing their ill-gotten profits at trial against
guaranteed losses in a declaratory judgment that may include punitive
damages, then profiting from willful infringement will no longer be a
viable prospect. Due process jurisprudence may provide an additional
check on the potential for abuse of punitive damages. Punitive
damages thus provide a practicable solution to achieving the
infringement-deterrence goal of the Copyright Act.
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